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Abstract
This paper presents an intertemporal political economy model of public finance
relevant for developing and transition countries where there is inherent political
instability. As in Cukierman et al. (1992), it is shown that political instability
causes myopic behaviour by a rational government resulting in high levels of
revenue from seigniorage. It is then argued that inflationary finance also increases
barter and currency substitution, but if the government tries to suppress them,
seigniorage taxation rises even more. Only international financial pressure can
help eliminate the inflationary finance trap, but becomes less effective as the
instability increases.
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1. Introduction
Political instability is known to produce myopic behaviour by the incumbent government.
There are two scenarios. In the first one a government attempts to raise its chances for re-
election by obtaining support through short term measures. This is the argument of the
traditional political business cycle literature (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975) as well as the modern
political instability literature where instability originates in electoral uncertainty (e.g.
Tabellini and Alesina, 1990)1. In the second scenario a government faces an exogenous
chance of loosing power (for instance, due to the threat of a coup d’état). In this situation, the
incumbent government highly discounts the future in favour of short term gains (for instance,
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992). More cynically, one could say that the government
tries to secure the spoils for as long as possible. This second scenario (of exogenous  political
instability) is particularly relevant for unstable and authoritarian developing countries as well
as for countries in transition.
In terms of public finance, such countries typically face at least two fundamental problems
which reinforce one another. First, there is virtually no domestic bond market, because
potential bondholders (both foreign and domestic) do not have confidence in any form of debt
issue. To obtain credit they depend on international loans. Yet these loans are typically
curtailed because of bad macroeconomic performance and allegations of mismanagement and
corruption. Second, given that existing tax collection problems cannot be overcome in the
short run (even in an authoritarian country), it is tempting for the government to use
seigniorage to finance government expenses. However, not only do high levels of inflation
entail a deadweight loss, but they also lead to a loss in confidence in the national currency.
This results in currency substitution and/or a large share of transactions between firms being
conducted by barter. The amount of real money balances held by the public is reduced and
inflationary finance becomes even more costly.
This paper investigates a government’s optimal fiscal policy choice under political
instability. It is appropriate to use a short run analysis because we want to study the
consequences of myopic behaviour produced by political instability. Since long term
considerations only have a small or negligible effect, they are excluded from the analysis to
limit the complexity of the model. In particular, we consider a no-growth economy.
Furthermore, tax rate changes can be ignored, because they would take too long to be
                                                         
1
 Here, as in Perrson and Svensson (1989), the focus is on fiscal policy in a two-party system. More recent
papers incorporate, for instance, voter uncertainty about the economy (Roemer, 1994, and Schultz, 1999 and
2002).
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implemented. Similarly, loan repayment obligations are irrelevant, if they are expected to
occur in some distant future.
In the analysis, it is first shown that inflationary finance increases with political instability,
a result already obtained by Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992). Political instability
typically leads to higher discounting of the future in favour of the current period.
Consequently, an optimising government behaves myopically and increases seigniorage
taxation in the current period. It also refrains from investing in the tax collection technology
(as in this paper) or eliminating inefficiencies in the tax system (as in Cukierman et al.). This
pattern of short-sighted behaviour is henceforth referred to as the inflationary finance trap.
Can the inflationary finance trap be overcome? Who can help the government? These are
the questions raised in the ensuing analysis. It is investigated whether the inflationary finance
trap can be overcome either by domestic policies directed at fighting barter and/or currency
substitution or, alternatively, by international financial institutions threatening to withdraw
international loans in response to monetary instability (i.e. high levels of inflationary finance).
Given that measures against barter and currency substitution only affect the symptoms of
inflationary finance, such policies will actually reduce the deadweight loss caused by
inflation. But it is then optimal for the government not to reduce, but instead to further
increase the level of inflationary finance. Even in the most optimistic case, namely that anti-
barter and anti-currency substitution measures are costless, it is shown that such policies are
counterproductive in terms of seigniorage reduction. By itself the government cannot
overcome the inflationary finance trap.
In contrast, under international financial pressure it is shown that a rational government is
compelled to reduce its level of inflationary finance. However, this effect gradually vanishes
under increasing political instability. International financial pressure turns ineffective in very
heterogeneous societies with frequent changes of government. In such highly unstable
countries, the more myopic government expands its revenues directly by increasing
seigniorage ignoring the effect on international credit. This is so, because it heavily discounts
the potential future benefits it could have accrued by reducing seigniorage today.
This paper is part of a growing literature which acknowledges that political instability may
be exogenous to government choices on fiscal policy. As in Alesina and Tabellini (1989),
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), Devereux and Wen (1998), and Svensson (1998),
for instance, government change is modelled as a Markov chain. This approach also allows to
incorporate an exogenous degree of political polarisation (or social heterogeneity), i.e. to
account for conflicting interests within society. There are two types of governments, but their
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objectives are identical except that they (symmetrically) either provide two different kinds of
public goods or, as in this paper, support different group interests. In all these models, optimal
government behaviour is driven by the political instability itself, not by differences in
preferences.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three respects. First, it offers a more
complete treatment of the public finance problem under myopia (which is caused by political
instability). Rational governments optimise given that there are both consumptive and
investment expenditures as well as three alternative sources of revenue: net gains from
taxation (losses are associated, for instance, with tax collection costs), net benefits from
foreign debt (depending, for instance, on interest rates and debt repayment conditions), and
seigniorage2. In contrast, the previous literature captures, in each case, only a selection of
aspects of the government finance problem. Those papers incorporate either  domestic debt
creation and taxation (as, for instance, in Devereux and Wen, 1998) or  foreign debt and
taxation (as in Alesina and Tabellini, 1989) or  infrastructure investment and taxation (as in
Svensson, 1998) or  seigniorage and taxation (as in Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992).
As a second extension, the paper incorporates the effects of inflationary finance on barter
and currency substitution, which in turn affect the deadweight loss of inflation. By allowing
the government to take administrative measures against barter and currency substitution, the
government is now given an additional tool for reducing the deadweight loss of inflationary
finance, not just by reducing seigniorage taxation, the original cause of the deadweight loss.
As a third extension, this paper captures the joint effects of foreign debt and so-called debt
conditionality on optimal government behaviour under exogenous political instability. Thus,
two aspects of many developing or early transitional countries are modelled in one and the
same framework: the exogenous nature of their political instability and the key role of foreign
debt in their public finance. Despite this fact, thus far (except for Alesina and Tabellini,
1989), the exogenous political instability literature has either discussed domestic debt only or
ignored debt altogether. In the real world, the amount of available debt typically depends on
World Bank or IMF conditionality. Whereas Bank conditionality is less clear cut, IMF
conditionality refers to “performance criteria (e.g., fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, growth of
money supply, etc.)” (Ray, 1998). In this paper, revenue deriving from foreign debt is
modelled to depend only on debt conditionality based on monetary stability (i.e. the growth of
money supply criterion).
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Sections 2 and 3 present the intertemporal model and discuss its economic and political
components. Section 4 presents the solution. The findings are discussed in section 5 and
section 6 concludes.

2. Model Structure
The model consists of two periods: period 1 (current period) and period 2 (next period). There
are two sectors in the economy: (i) the government; and (ii) the private sector. The model is
specified in real terms. An overview of the model is given below and details concerning
taxation, seigniorage and government borrowing are provided in section 3.

Government Budget Constraints
The government budget constraints for periods 1 and 2 are:
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    (1)
The right hand side specifies the three sources of government revenue. First, taxation  at
time t, tT ,  depends on previous period tax investments 1−tR , i.e. there is a taxation technology
(discussed further down). Taxation in period 1 is exogenous since any tax investment prior to
period 1 is already bygone. Taxation in period 2 is determined by endogenous first period tax
investment 1R  which is a government instrument. A fraction θ of tax revenues is lost due
to inefficiencies related to information costs, tax collection costs, etc.3
Second, seigniorage S in each period is the other government instrument. In many
developing countries it is not unrealistic to assume that there is no distinction between the
central bank and the government. The link to the rate of monetary growth and the deadweight
loss of seigniorage taxation is discussed further down. Third, the availability of international
loans ϕ hinges on the government's monetary stability stance which is expressed by the level
                                                                                                                                                                                   
2
 As for seigniorage, the political instability approach here can be viewed as an extension to the optimal inflation
literature (for instance, Phelps, 1973, and Mundell, 1965), in particular to Ferreira (1999) where inflationary
finance can be used for public investment.
3
 This is a standard assumption to capture (avoidable and unavoidable) inefficiencies, but it is not crucial for the
results.
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of seigniorage taxation in the previous period 1−S  (also discussed further down). 1ϕ  is
exogenous as seigniorage prior to period 1 is already bygone.
Government expenditure consists of two kinds: investment  R in the taxation technology;
and consumptive spending F  and G (henceforth partial interest spending). In most of the
aforementioned models of political instability, government consumption is interpreted as
expenditure for public goods. In this model, F  and G are interpreted as provisions for two
distinct groups of clients (but the difference in interpretation does not affect the results). The
common feature is that they do not enter the private sector budget constraint. Partial interest
spending F  and G  may be either eaten up directly or taken outside of the country. An example
for the former is soup kitchens for the poor. An example for the latter, F and G could be
viewed as subsidies or bribes diverted from the government budget to members of the ruling
classes (or near government institutions or firms).4

Government Preferences and Political Instability
Government preferences over periods 1 and 2 are given by the following utility function:
 W  =  )([ ] .)2,2(2)2(2)1,1(1)1(1 FGHCVEFGHCV +++ ρ  (2)
The V.(⋅) functions are concave and twice continuously differentiable utility functions in
private sector consumption C. The H.(⋅) functions are the (partial interest) utility functions in
government provision G and F for the two partial interest groups. E  is the expectation
operator and ρ is the government’s discount rate. Total government utility is additively
separable in two senses: first, with respect to periods; and second, with respect to utility
derived either from private consumption or from partial interest provision.
Assuming two types of governments (i.e. policymakers) political instability means: (i) the
probability of government change and (ii) political polarisation. After the first period the
incumbent government may lose office to the other set of policymakers with a fixed
probability pi and it stays in power with probability (1 - pi).5  Each of the two types of
                                                         
4
 Clans surrounding Mobutu in Zaïre, various segments of the Suharto family in Indonesia, or various groups of
the so-called oligarchs in Russia are historical examples in question. In the real world, a large proportion of these
funds were and are still (illegally) transferred to foreign bank accounts.
5
 Technically, this random change of government at fixed intervals is a Markov chain. If several time periods
were considered and their lengths were fixed, for instance, at six months, some governments would only be in
power for half a year, fewer would last for a year, and fewer yet for any longer period of time. This is a simple
way of describing political instability, but it matches the situation in many developing or transition countries. In
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government cares for both partial interest groups, but to differing degrees. Political
polarisation then depends on the differences of policymakers’ preferences with respect to
partial interests. The government utility function H for partial interest spending is specified
for one type of government (for the other type, α must be replaced by (1-α)):
 [ ] .)1(,min)1(
1),( FGGFH αα
αα
−
−
=      (3)
For simplicity, their disagreement in partial interest spending is parameterised
symmetrically by α which is exogenous. Without limiting the general validity of the analysis,
it is assumed that
2
11 ≥≥ α .  When α equals half, the two types of government have identical
preferences; the more distant α is from half, the more they disagree on how much to spend on
each of the two partial interest groups. If preferences of both policymaker types are very
dissimilar, political polarisation is large. Thus political polarisation measured by α contributes
to political instability because it accounts for the extent of preference changes given a change
in government. For α equal to one half, the instability effect of a government change is
eliminated.

Private Sector Budget Constraints
The private sector budget constraint determines real private consumption C  in each
period:

( ) ( )
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Real private consumption depends on real income net of all taxes and deadweight losses.
Each period the private sector is endowed with some fixed income, for simplicity taken to be
1.6  The government collects tax )( 1−RT  and seigniorage revenue S. In addition, the private
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Russia, for instance, there were 5 changes of government in 1998 and 1999 despite the fact that no Duma or
presidential elections were held. President Yeltsin alternately replaced representatives of the nomenclature
(Chernomyrdin, Primakov, Putin) with so-called reformist Prime Ministers (Chubais, Stepashin) in arbitrary and
irregular intervals.
6
 Alternatively, the model could be interpreted in per capita terms.
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sector must bear deadweight losses for both tax and seigniorage, equal to ( ))( 1−RTδ  and
( )1, −SSγ , respectively. They are specified in the next section.
A fixed endowment implies there is no growth and the private sector is passive in the sense
that it cannot take optimising decisions on labour, savings or investment (as, for instance, in
Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini, 1992). Thus the two budget constraints are not directly
linked intertemporally. These assumptions allow us to focus on the government and its
decision problem. This simplification may be justified in two ways: first, this is a short run
model; and, second, growth in transition and developing countries is largely determined by
other factors, for instance, foreign direct investment.

3. A Closer Look at Government Revenue
The aforementioned three types of revenue are motivated and their implications are discussed:
(i) the link between seigniorage and money supply growth as well as the deadweight loss of
seigniorage; (ii) income taxation and its deadweight loss; and (iii) government borrowing as
well as the functional format of net credit in period 2.

Money Supply Growth, Inflation and Seigniorage
The discussion in this subsection is beyond the formal model presented in the paper. Only real
seigniorage is captured in the model, but there is an implicit link to money, prices and
inflation. (Real) seigniorage taxation is the financing of government spending by means of
new base money injection, i.e. the change in real money (the change in nominal money, M ,
divided by price level P):
 ( ) .ˆˆ ePLM
P
M
M
M
P
MS ==≡

     (5)
Real seigniorage revenues S can be rewritten in terms of the rate of monetary growth
M
M

( Mˆ= ) and the real supply of money
P
M
. In equilibrium, money supply equals the demand
for real base money balances ( )ePL ˆ ,  where ePˆ  is the expected rate of inflation and L
decreases in ePˆ . It is well established that there is a strong link between the expected rate of
inflation and the actual rate of monetary growth (in the steady state they are identical). In his
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study of hyperinflations, Cagan (1956) showed empirically that there is a Laffer-type trade-off
between the seigniorage tax rate Mˆ  and the seigniorage tax base ( )ePL ˆ .  This implies a
maximum value for S as shown in the figure depicting seigniorage and monetary growth.
Later, Sargent (1977) and Christiano (1987), for instance, confirmed this result.

Figure: Seigniorage





Source: Cagan (1956) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992)

As the relationship between seigniorage and inflation is not modelled explicitly in this
paper the implicit assumption is that the government chooses an optimal rate of monetary
growth, i.e. a growth rate on the rising branch in the figure. In terms of model results, this
means that there may be situations in which the level of seigniorage cannot be raised any
more. In more technical terms, this implies that the results only apply, if there is no corner
solution, i.e. if S has not reached its maximum.

Deadweight Loss of Seigniorage
Seigniorage taxation produces welfare losses for the private sector. This so-called deadweight
loss traditionally includes at least three types of costs: First, higher inflation leads to lower
levels of real money holdings, thereby raising the cost of keeping a certain level of liquidity
(the shoe leather argument). Second, inflation produces a loss of regular tax revenue (the so-
called Olivera-Tanzi-effect), if there is no base structure indexation. There are costs involved
in preserving the same level of government tax revenues, which must be born by the private
Mˆ
µ
S
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sector in the end. Third, various redistribution effects, for instance between debtors and
creditors, also cause welfare losses.7
The deadweight loss can be expressed by the following function:
 ( ) .Stt γγ =          (6)
Deadweight loss γ  is rising and convex ( 0>′tγ ,  0>′′tγ ,  t=1,2). Intuitively, this is a
reasonable assumption because the marginal increase in seigniorage at a higher level of
seigniorage is typically associated with a more substantial rise in inflation compared to the
rise of inflation at a lower level of seigniorage (as suggested by the rising branch of the
figure). Thus it suffices that the effect of inflation on welfare costs is linear, it may even be
slightly concave.
In the context of developing and transition economies, the concept of deadweight loss must
be extended, because high levels of inflation typically erode the trust of the private sector in
using the national currency for transactions. Thereby, the levels of barter trade and currency
substitution in the economy are raised. Currency substitution has been a wide-spread problem,
for instance, in Eastern European as well as Latin American countries. Barter trade amounted
to an estimated 50% of all industry transactions in Russia at the end of the 1990s. Formally,
the deadweight loss γ could be depicted by γ = η(S,b,c). Welfare losses are caused by
seigniorage directly – as discussed in the previous paragraph – as well as through its effect on
barter b and currency substitution c (where b and c, in turn, are functions of seigniorage:
b=b(S) and c=c(S)). Combining these three equations and allowing for intertemporal links,
the deadweight loss γ can be expressed by:
 ( )1, −= SSγγ          (7)
It is typically assumed that γ is rising and convex in both arguments (γ ’ > 0, γ ’’ > 0). This
is a reasonable assumption because, intuitively, the effect of inflation on welfare costs directly
and through barter trade and currency substitution may be slightly decreasing (almost linear)
or even increasing. However, it takes larger increases of inflation to produce the same amount
of additional seigniorage for higher levels of inflation (cf. the rising branch in the figure).
                                                         
7
 Note that there is no positive effect for the country as a whole due to a reduction of the real value of debt,
because foreign debt is typically denominated in foreign currency.
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Taken together, this means that an additional rise of seigniorage causes a stronger and
stronger increase of the deadweight loss for higher and higher levels of seigniorage.
For obtaining answers on some issues, it is necessary to further specify the functional
format of deadweight loss equation (7):
 )( 21122 −+= SS ννµγ   0,0, 12 ≥> ννµ    (8)
Exogenous parameters 2ν  and 1ν  specify the relative impact of both periods’ seigniorage.
Coefficient µ is an exogenous scale parameter capturing the effect of behavioural or policy
changes that do not affect the relative impact. A reduction means a fall in the total deadweight
loss. Raising the trust of the public in the government’s medium or long term monetary
strategy could bring this about. However, the decline of µ may also represent an
administrative intervention to suppress barter and currency substitution. It may be difficult to
curb barter trade because it is always possible formally to make out two separate contracts. It
is, however, possible to prohibit the use of foreign currency and to act against black markets
for it, even though this may not be totally costless as assumed in this paper.

Taxation and Its Deadweight Loss
In this paper, the government income tax revenue8  is not affected by income because a no-
growth economy is modelled. Nonetheless, total tax receipts could change, at least in
principle, because both the tax rate and the tax base could vary. As for the tax rate, it is
typically assumed in the literature that it cannot be altered in the short run. It takes a while to
pass legislation and enact tax rate changes, even in an authoritarian regime. In developing and
transition countries with some degree of political instability parliamentary opposition is often
stiff and policy changes involving taxation are not feasible in what would be one or two
model periods. Thus tax rate changes are ruled out here. As for the tax base, it depends on the
tax morale and tax enforcement. In many transition and developing countries only a rather
small fraction of income enters the tax base. However, increased spending on enforcement R,
for instance training of additional tax inspectors, should raise next period’s tax base and,
                                                         
8
 Implicitly, it is assumed that there are no indirect consumption or capital taxes.
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therefore, tax revenue T  in the next period. The model accounts for such a taxation
technology9:
 ( )1−= RTT          (9)
with T  ’>0 and T ’’<0. The tax investment function is concave due to decreasing returns to
scale.
Similar to seigniorage revenue, taxation also carries a welfare loss for the private sector
because the introduction of non-lump sum taxes causes a departure from Pareto-optimality. In
particular, the distortions affect the allocation decisions of consumers (not modelled), thereby
affecting the total amount of consumption. The deadweight loss (or excess burden) of taxation
is given by:
 ( ))( 1−= RTδδ  .         (10)
The deadweight loss of taxation is assumed to be increasing (in tax revenue T) at an
increasing rate, i.e. δ ’>0 and δ ’’>0 (convex).10  Intuitively, this makes sense. For instance,
consider the large disincentive impact on labour supply when progressive income taxes bite.
When the tax rate is already high, a relatively small rise of the tax rate has over-proportional
effects on the willingness to work, thus over-proportionally increasing the deadweight loss of
taxation.
The opposite curvature of )( 1−RT  and of ( ))(⋅Tδ  requires additional assumptions to ensure
that the model specified further down has a well-defined maximum (i.e. to guarantee that the
government utility function is concave). To satisfy semi-definiteness conditions, it is a
sufficient condition that ( ))()( 11 −− + RTRT δ  be convex in 1−R . Less restrictive assumptions
are possible, but this (technical) assumption simplifies the analysis considerably.

                                                         
9
 The taxation technology modeled here as well as in Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) capture the time
lag between investment and its effect. But there are two differences: First, those authors model the reduction of
inefficiencies in the tax collection process (θ  in equation 1), whereas here a widening of the tax base is
accounted for. In both cases additional investment leads to higher tax revenue net of tax collection costs.
However, second and more crucially, their tax investment (which they call “tax reform”) is costless, whereas
here costs of an investment are explicitly considered.
10
 This corresponds to the assumption made for seigniorage. The same concept is used by Cukierman, Edwards
and Tabellini (1992).
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Government Borrowing
Generally speaking, the monetary stability stance of the government affects both government
borrowing opportunities and private sector decisions on barter and currency substitution (the
latter influencing the deadweight loss of seigniorage as already discussed). In both cases,
credibility is at stake. In the case of barter and currency substitution, it is the trust of the
domestic private sector only. As for government borrowing, credibility refers to domestic and
foreign agents. Hence the government budget constraint should be affected by the private
sector’s decisions on holding bonds and by foreigners’ willingness to give aid or loans. But
foreign creditors and private individuals will only make their funds available, if they have
sufficient trust in the government.
Here it is assumed that the government has already lost most of its credibility and can only
obtain funds from foreign financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or
the World Bank. Their willingness to lend depends on criteria referred to as debt
conditionality. The principle aim of such credit is not to make a profit (which would imply
some conditionality to avoid default and ensure full repayment); instead, debt conditionality is
typically motivated by more general considerations such as economic and political stability or
long run growth. Whereas World Bank conditionality is less clear cut, IMF conditionality
refers to “performance criteria (e.g., fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, growth of money supply,
etc.)”.11 
In this paper, revenue deriving from foreign debt is modelled to depend only on debt
conditionality based on monetary stability (i.e. the growth of the money supply). To
operationalise the criterion, we derive from equation (5) together with the quantity equation
(M*V=Y*P, V being velocity and Y  being output) and the exogeneity of Y  (normalised at
unity): VMS
ˆ
= .
12
 Instead of basing the criterion on the money supply growth rate, it
can also be based on seigniorage S  (while acknowledging that fluctuations in V
would affect S).
In principle, every credit contract includes repayment obligations. This is also true for
loans given by international financial institutions, even though credit conditions are not
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 Ray (1998). On IMF and World Bank conditionality, cf. also Guitián (1995), Goldstein (2001), The Economist
(2001) and Bhagwati (2002).
12
 Real seigniorage is given by
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, where P is the price level, V is
velocity, M is nominal money, and Y is nominal output.
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determined by the perceived chances of repayment. International financial institutions try to
get their money back, for instance, by debt rescheduling agreements in case of difficulties
faced by the recipient country. Nonetheless, they accept that part of their loans will never be
paid back. From the perspective of the developing or transition country, debt repayment only
starts after several years and, in case of default and rescheduling, it may be postponed to a
distant future. In fact, most developing countries receive net credit for an extended period of
time.
In this paper, it is not obvious how to model debt repayment so that it is both realistic and
consistent with the short run perspective taken to capture the consequences of myopic
behaviour produced by political instability. A theoretically clean solution is to assume that the
government in question repays debt only as long as there is a positive stream of net credit (i.e.
in the second model period), but plans to renege on its debt otherwise (the argument is similar
to the one in Cohen and Sachs, 1986). However, the government intentions are assumed to be
private information so that the willingness of international financial institutions to supply debt
is not affected.13

Net Credit
Formally, the second model period features net credit ϕ (in real terms). ϕ is modelled to
depend on previous period seigniorage only:
 ( )1−= Sϕϕ          (11)
The government can choose a certain level of seigniorage which corresponds to some level
of inflation and results in some degree of monetary stability (and international credibility). If
this period’s level of seigniorage taxation is high, foreign financial institutions will reduce the
amount of available funds. This is special form of ex ante conditionality suitable for the short
run analysis presented here.14  Credibility (and hence international net credit) does not depend
on a government’s promise or, indeed, on its reputation, say to be a reformist or pro-market
government. Instead, it is solely the monetary policy decision taken last period.
                                                         
13
 In principle, capturing both debt conditionality and debt repayment requires a three period model where the
third period would be interpreted as the long run. Such an approach would render the model intractable without
depicting reality more closely.
14
 Think of the IMF freeing a loan installment once a pre-specified performance criterion (like a certain growth
rate of the money supply) has been met.
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Moreover, it is assumed that ϕ is decreasing and concave (ϕ ’ < 0, ϕ ’’ < 0). This is not
very restrictive. Given that the increase of inflation for a certain rise in seigniorage is larger
for higher levels of seigniorage, the concavity assumption even includes the case of ϕ being
weakly convex in inflation. Intuitively, net credit ϕ  should, however, decrease more and
more sharply for the loss of credibility reflected in higher and higher levels of inflation.
For obtaining answers on some issues, it is necessary to introduce a specific assumption for
ϕ:

2
1−−= Sσκϕ   0,0 ≥> σκ      (12)
Constant κ represents the maximum amount of net credit which can only be achieved for
no seigniorage (and zero inflation) in the previous period. Parameter σ reflects the
‘punishment’ for monetary instability. σ incorporates the exogenously determined pressure
put on the government by, say, foreign financial institutions. Hence a policy change at the
IMF towards requiring higher standards for monetary stability could be captured by an
exogenous increase in σ.


4. Model Solution
The maximisation problem of the government is formulated in full first, but then a trick is used
to decompose it into two separate problems: (i) the distribution of the total partial interest
spending between the two groups; and (ii) the fundamental revenue and expenditure problem
of the government.

Government Maximisation Problem
Given the specifications in the last section the current government must solve the following
maximisation problem with budget constraints (i) and (ii) for the public sector and budget
constraints (iii) and (iv) for the private sector:
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The problem exhibits several intertemporal links. Let us look at the government budget
constraints first. Higher tax investment increases tax revenues in the following period, thus
requiring less net credit next period, which, in turn, means that higher levels of seigniorage
would be possible this period. Conversely, higher seigniorage this period causes lower
revenues next period (due to reduced net credit opportunities), but enables higher tax
investment this period, thus leading to higher tax revenues next period. Essentially, the
government budget constraint exhibits a trade-off between the intertemporal effects of
seigniorage and taxation. In addition, every increase in taxation and/or seigniorage adversely
affects the private sector budget constraint (both directly and through its deadweight loss).
Thus an increase in public spending and the utility derived thereof entails a decrease in private
sector spending and the utility obtained from private consumption. These prima facie
considerations are confirmed by the first order conditions (presented in appendix B).
Potentially, there is a time-inconsistency problem. In period 1 the incumbent government
optimises based on expectations for period 2, in which the government changes with
probability   . In principle, a new government could re-optimise in period 2 – once the
uncertainty is resolved. However, it will be clear from the discussion in the next subsection
that, under assumption (3), both governments always choose the same level of total  partial
interest spending (F+G). Hence the fundamental decision on the sources of revenue and on
the division between tax investment and total partial interest spending will not be affected by
a government change.

Partial Interests and Government Utility
Government problem (13) is made tractable because of three assumptions: (i), partial interest
spending F and G does not appear in the private sector budget constraint; (ii), government
objective function (2) is additively separable; (iii), the polarisation assumption embedded in
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equation (3), the government utility function H for partial interest spending, has a special
functional format. Due to assumptions (i) and (ii) government optimisation problem (13) can
be decomposed into two problems: first, the optimal  distribution of the total partial interest
spending between F and G; and second, the fundamental  revenue and expenditure problem of
the government.
The optimal  distribution problem is not really interesting since its results hinge on specific
(though quite sensible) assumptions for partial interest utility H (assumption (iii)). Indeed, the
mathematical solution of the distribution problem for partial interest spending (cf. appendix
A) is only required for being able to solve the fundamental revenue and expenditure problem
of the government. Due to assumption (iii) – i.e. the special format of partial interest utility
function H – the fundamental problem of the government is independent of the actual
government in power. Nonetheless, the fact  that there are two potential governments
does have crucial implications for any government decision on the total amount of
partial interest spending, on tax investment and on seigniorage financing. In fact, the
model is constructed that way to allow the analysis of political instability by itself as
opposed to analysing the effect of different types of government with different
objectives.
As shown in appendix A, assumption (iii), which refers to the functional format of utility
function H, has three specific implications. First, the optimal distribution of the total partial
interest spending between F and G is crosswise symmetrical for both types of governments
(when in power). Second, government utility H  derived from type i’s choice of F  and G
(when in power) is equal to government utility derived from type k’s choice (when in
power):
 .),(),( kkkkkkiiiiii GFHGFXXXGFGFH =+====+=    (14)
In either case, the marginal utility of partial interest spending is unity. Third, the (real) total
value of partial interest spending H is normalised – for each government – by the sum of its
arguments (F+G), when chosen optimally by any incumbent government. For i  and k
representing different governments and
2
1
>α  being assumed (without loss of
generality), note, however, that government k’s optimal choice for F and G is, of
course, suboptimal for government i: ikkiiiii XGFHGFHX
α
α−
=>=
1),(),( .
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On this basis,  the government utility function (2), can be simplified. For each
period separately, utility derived from private consumption and from partial interest
spending is considered for the government in power in period 1  only. Superscripts
are only used for the other government (marked by k). In period 1, this government’s
optimal choice for F  and G  results in .),( 111 XGFH =  Thus first period utility is
 .)(),()( 1111111 XCVFGHCV +=+      (15)
If  this government is still in power in period 2 (with probability (1-pi)), it  will
choose F  and G  such that .),( 222 XGFH =  If,  however, this government looses power
in period 2 (with probability pi), it  has to put up with the partial  interest spending
chosen by the other government, i.e. 222
1),( XGFH kk
α
α−
= .  Hence its second period
total expected utility is:
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Thus government utility depends on two exogenous parameters, political polarisation α
and the probability of loosing power pi, which are subsumed under quasi-exogenous parameter
β, which is to represent political instability:
11)1(),(0 ≤−+−=≤
α
α
pipipiαβ . Obviously, β  = 1 if both governments
have identical preferences (
2
1
=α ) or if the government stays in power with certainty (pi
= 0). For α = 1 and pi = 1, β  = 0. In other words, β  decreases with more political diversity
(polarisation α↑) and/or more political uncertainty (probability of government change pi↑).

The Fundamental Problem of the Government
The fundamental revenue and expenditure problem of the government can now be specified
on the basis of the original government problem (13) and equations (15) and (16).
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Remembering that ttt XGF =+  (t=1,2) the government budget constraints (i) and (ii) can be
substituted into equations (15) and (16). Equally, private sector budget constraints (iii) and
(iv) for tC  (t=1,2) can be inserted into (15) and (16). Then the new objective function is:
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The formal solution is quite technical and will only be sketched out here. Basically, one
must proceed in three steps. First, first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to policy
variables 121 ,, RSS  must be obtained. These necessary conditions for an optimum are
presented in appendix B. To ensure that they are also sufficient conditions, the
concavity properties of the problem must be scrutinised by checking the Hessian for
semi-definiteness. Finally, results are obtained for the four exogenous parameters which
were discussed in sections 2 and 3.
The probability of government change pi and political polarisation α are represented by β,
the political instability parameter, which was introduced in equation (16). Scale parameter µ
captures exogenous government policies aimed at curbing barter and currency substitution.
Parameter σ refers to the ‘punishment’ for monetary instability exogenously set by
international financial institutions. For all of these, perturbation results around the equilibrium
can be obtained by deriving total differentials and using the Cramer Rule or by applying the
inverted Hessian. Findings of the analysis are discussed in the next section.

5. Discussion
The findings are discussed with respect to the three parameters referring to: (i) political
instability; (ii) domestic politics; and (iii) foreign agents’ policies. They are summarised in the
Table of Results further down.
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Political Instability
As stated before, exogenous political instability takes two forms: political polarisation and/or
uncertainty about the future government. An increase in polarisation means that policy
choices of the other government, if in power in the second period, produce more undesirable
results. A higher chance of government change means that it is less likely that policy choices
which are optimal for the current government will be implemented in the future. In both cases,
this causes the government to value the present more highly than an uncertain and undesirable
future. This is the basis for the result of myopic government behaviour in the literature. In
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) political instability leads to less structural change
and higher seigniorage, in Devereux and Wen (1998) to higher government spending and
lower growth, in Svensson (1998) to lower investment in property rights and lower private
investment, and in Alesina and Tabellini (1989) to lower capital formation, higher external
debt and capital flight.
The well-established result of myopic government behaviour is confirmed in this paper. If
there is a higher probability of government change and/or more polarisation in the national
political system, the government becomes more concerned about the short term. The revenue
effects of increased seigniorage in period 1 are exploited, and less public funds are spent on
tax investments. Partial interest spending is shifted from period 2 to period 1 because second
period expected partial interest utility is reduced with the increased risk of loosing power to a
government which will choose a less desirable partial interest distribution.
Table of Results
 S1  R1  S2
Political instability ↑: β↓ ↑ ↓ ?
   - government change probability ↑ pi↑  
   - political polarisation ↑ α↑  
Anti-barter & currency substitution policies ↑   ↓ ? ↓ ?
   - last period S does not affect deadweight loss
    under ν1=0 ↑ ↓ ↑
   
International financial pressure ↑ σ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
   - under more political stability
    under β  high   
   - under more political instability
    under β  low (↓) (↑) (↑)
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Even though we are mainly interested in the short run effects, it is instructive to look at
effects on second period seigniorage. On the one hand, one might expect a reduction of
seigniorage revenue in period 2 due to the intertemporal reallocation of resources. Second
period seigniorage revenue is evaluated less highly than revenue from seigniorage in period 1.
On the other hand, there are two reasons why a higher amount of seigniorage may,
nonetheless, be required in period 2. First, the elevated level of seigniorage in period 1
produces negative credibility effects leading to reduced credit opportunities in period 2.
Second, reduced tax investments causing lower tax revenues in period 2 can only be
compensated by raising seigniorage revenues. The overall effect is, therefore, ambiguous;
hence the question mark in the table of results.

Domestic Policies
Next, consider active domestic policies to curb barter and currency substitution
administratively (henceforth anti-b&c-policies). They are represented by a reduction of µ. As
mentioned before, an exogenous change of µ could also be interpreted as an increase of trust in
the government’s (medium to long term) monetary policy stance. In any case, if the private
sector’s (voluntary or forced) acceptance of the domestic currency increases, the real money
demand, i.e. the seigniorage tax base, is not so much reduced for a given level of seigniorage.
Even though this is not explicit to the model, we can see from equation 5 that the money
supply growth rate (i.e. the seigniorage tax rate) can be lower when the seigniorage tax base is
higher (reduced by less). Inflation would be expected to be lower in the long run. As a
consequence, the deadweight loss of seigniorage is reduced. The effect of µ on the deadweight
loss γ is captured directly by equation (8).
Since the effects of seigniorage are not so bad any more, the government will be inclined to
increase revenues derived from seigniorage while reducing tax investments. Model results are
unambiguous, if barter and currency substitution decisions, hence the deadweight loss, do not
determined by previous period seigniorage (cf. table of results for 01 =ν ). For 01 >ν ,
however, results depend on the responsiveness of the deadweight loss on seigniorage in both
periods. Under certain parameter constellations, it may be optimal for the government to
decrease the level of seigniorage revenues at least in one period. Under all circumstances, it
remains optimal, however, to reduce tax investments.
Since anti-b&c-policies tend to produce higher levels of seigniorage, one might be tempted
to conclude that a lower level of barter and currency substitution must be undesirable. In the
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context of the model analysed here, this is not true for two reasons. First, less barter and
currency substitution means a reduction of welfare losses, because the deadweight loss of
seigniorage is reduced. Second, despite the rise of seigniorage, inflation may still be reduced as
the seigniorage tax base increases. These favourable effects would, however, be diminished (or
there could be an overall welfare loss), if the costs involved in anti-b&c-policies were included
in the analysis.15  Moreover, high levels of seigniorage may cause a future dependence on
seigniorage revenues (which is also not captured in the model).
So far, we have seen that a politically unstable country cannot by itself get rid of its
dependence on seigniorage. Due to its short-sightedness, the government is stuck in the
inflationary finance trap. The question arises, if foreign involvement can remedy the situation.
This is discussed in the next subsection.

International Financial Pressure and the IMF Dilemma
If the government is faced with foreign agents who can credibly commit to ‘punishing’ the
government for monetary instability (i.e. ex ante conditionality based on high seigniorage), any
government will try to avoid the loss of aid or foreign loans.16  With σ rising in equation (12),
period 2 net credit is reduced for any given level of seigniorage. As a consequence, the
optimising government chooses a reduction of seigniorage revenues in period 1 (cf. Table of
Results) to limit the negative effect on net credit. But this does not completely offset the
reduction of second period revenues. Despite its myopic behaviour, in principle, it is now
optimal for the government to shift revenue incomes to the second period. First, second period
seigniorage can be increased without doing harm to future borrowing opportunities (since
period 2 is the end period of the model). Only the private sector budget constraint is
(negatively) affected. Second, tax revenues in period 2 are raised due to additional tax
investment in period 1. This is so despite the fact that (seigniorage) revenues in period 1 are
already reduced compared to a situation without international financial pressure. 
Qualitatively, these results are valid under more and under less political stability. However,
if political polarisation or the probability of government change rise (lower β), international
financial pressure has smaller effects on seigniorage and taxation. In particular, international
                                                         
15
 Another view on the welfare effects of currency substitution is taken in Morrien (1996). Depending on the
start situation, it may be favorable to increase currency substitution, if the position of the mainly used currency is
strengthened. Hayashi and Matsui (1996) present a specific model on barter equilibria.
16
 This is consistent with the earlier assumption that the repayment of loans is either not considered by the
government or only plays a negligible role. In a more general framework, one would have to assume that there
are sufficient profitable investment opportunities the government could seize.
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pressure is less effective in reducing a government’s willingness to use seigniorage for
financing its revenues in period 1. For β  approaching zero the effect vanishes.
This is bad news for international financial institutions. Setting a priori conditions for
monetary stability as a precondition for giving aid or loans may be ineffective. Political
polarisation and/or the chance of government change makes current governments behave
myopically so that incentives for the future may only have little effect. The upshot is that prior
to solving the monetary stability problem, the political stability problem must be overcome.
In a more general context, the conditionality of loans given by the IMF or the World Bank
should be put under scrutiny. The dilemma of these international institutions is that they are
economic institutions, but political considerations may prove more effective than economic
ones. Nonetheless, these institutions have already moved away from the so-called Washington
consensus with its one-sided emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation. In recent years, they
have acknowledged the important role played by institutions. What remains to have to be
recognised is that the political conditions, too, are decisive.
In the short term in may be prudent to stabilise the current political system. It may be
necessary to supply immediate loans, even if a lot of funds are used inefficiently. The
withdrawal of financial support (in other words, exerting financial pressure) may not affect
government policies, but may well contribute to a weakening or ousting of the present
government and/or destabilise the system as a whole. In the medium term, funds should be
given for building up and strengthening legal, political, and social institutions to obtain more
political stability (both in terms of government continuity and in terms of society
cohesiveness). Ideally, support should be tied to specific tasks. But even if this is not entirely
possible, it may be sensible to give aid or loans for building up institutions.

6. Conclusion
This paper introduces a simple framework for studying the problem of optimal government
finance under political instability. It is suited to analyse the case of developing and transition
countries, where political instability is inherent to the political structure of the country rather
than caused by electoral uncertainty as in Western democracies. A country’s political situation
is characterised by its uncertainty about government change and its political polarisation
within society. Alternative means for financing government spending are considered.
Seigniorage, taxation, and government borrowing are analysed in the context of barter and
currency substitution, taxation investment, and foreign financial pressure, respectively.
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Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, Cukierman, Edwards and
Tabellini’s (1992) theoretical result that political instability increases the optimal level of
seigniorage chosen by the government is substantiated. In this paper, as in theirs, political
instability leads to higher discounting of the future in favour of the current period.
Consequently, the government increases seigniorage taxation in the current period and
refrains from investing in the tax collection technology. Due to political instability the
government is caught in an inflationary finance trap.
The second conclusion is that a government cannot overcome the inflationary finance trap
by using domestic policies directed at alleviating the negative effects of seigniorage. The
model incorporates the feature that inflationary finance typically produces barter and currency
substitution, which in turn affect the deadweight loss of seigniorage. By allowing the
government to take administrative measures against barter and currency substitution, this
paper opens an alternative channel for reducing the deadweight loss to merely reducing
seigniorage itself. However, even in the most optimistic case, namely that such measures are
costless, it is shown that they are counterproductive in terms of seigniorage reduction.
Altogether, it is shown that domestic policies aimed at curing the symptoms of inflationary
finance may be ambiguous. On the one hand, private agents’ trust in the own currency and thus
the predominant role of the national currency is restored. Welfare losses caused by barter and
currency substitution are reduced, and inflation may go down despite higher seigniorage
revenues (because the tax base is larger again). On the other hand, it could be argued that high
levels of seigniorage cause a future dependence on seigniorage revenues. Hence it is argued
that the government cannot overcome the inflationary finance trap by itself.
The third conclusion is that the international community can help, if the domestic political
situation is not extremely unstable. The model accounts for ex ante conditionality with respect
to monetary instability. International financial institutions give net credit to the country in
question dependent on its previous period level of seigniorage taxation. It is shown that foreign
financial pressure causes utility maximising governments to scale down on seigniorage
taxation, thus achieving a higher level of monetary stability.
However, ex ante conditionality based on monetary stability turns ineffective in very
heterogeneous societies with highly unstable governments, i.e. it does not prompt such
governments to reduce seigniorage. The argument is based on the fact that more political
instability means a relatively higher valuation of the current period. A rational government is
so myopic that it prefers to increase present period revenue by raising its seigniorage tax
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instead of fulfilling conditions (low level of seigniorage) required for obtaining foreign debt
in the future.
This problem has a more general dimension. In highly polarised countries with a high
probability of government change, the government heavily discounts potential future benefits it
could accrue by restraining its behaviour today. The key problem is, therefore, to promote
political stability. As a first step, it is crucial to initiate structural reform involving the build-up
and strengthening of legal, political, and social institutions. International financial institutions
may have ignored this aspect in their transformation and development strategies far too long.
Fortunately, an international consensus on the need for institution-building strategies seems to
be developing.
A natural complement to this short run model is a long run perspective including,
nonetheless, political instability. This could be done in an infinite horizon framework or,
possibly, in a three-period model. Not only would additional time periods contribute to a more
complex model structure, but a number of additional issues would have to be addressed, for
instance: (i) how to include growth in the model and study its impact on political instability;
(ii) how to incorporate a government tax instrument; and (iii) how to include debt repayment in
such a long run model. In a more extended framework that includes some of the above issues it
might be conjectured that a certain initial level of political stability is required as a
precondition for getting on a path of recovery. We might, for instance, get a multiple equilibria
story for optimal government behaviour under political instability similar to the one obtained
by, for instance, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) for optimal rent-seeking behaviour.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Optimal Partial Interest Spending
The following exposition draws from Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). The same
approach is also used in Svensson (1998). For convenience, polarisation assumption (3) which
is embedded in the government utility function H for partial interest spending is restated for
the type i government:
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Since (A-1) contains a minimum function, optimality can only be achieved for
 .)1( ii GF αα =−         (A-2)
As the utility function H  for the type k  government is symmetrical according to its definition
in section 2, so is the optimal distribution between kF  and kG : kk FG αα =− )1( .

Government i’s optimal total partial interest spending iX  can be written as
 .
1 αα
ii
iii FGGFX =
−
=+≡       (A-3)
By reinserting in utility function (A-1) the optimal values for F and G in terms of X
( ii XG )1( α−= , ii XF α= ) a simple result for total partial interest utility H is obtained:
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Given that utility function (A-1) is symmetrical for both types of government, the optimal
values for F and G are crosswise identical ( ki GF =  and ki FG = ) and
 27
 .),(),( kkkiii GFHXGFH ==       (A-5)

Appendix B: First Order Conditions
Necessary conditions for a maximum are obtained by setting zero the partial derivative of W
(in the government revenue problem 18) with respect to policy variables 1S ,  2S ,  and 1R ,
respectively:
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A prime (‘) denotes the derivative with respect to a functions argument. In the only case with
two arguments, in ),( 2122 SSγγ = ,  the argument of differentiation is specified in
brackets after the prime, e.g. ),( 21)(2 1 SSSγ ′ .
